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I respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion in this case, because the DOT training program was not, in any relevant sense, Diamond Jo’s agent in providing the facilities and parking lot in which Ms. Rannals’s accident occurred. For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the judgment of the district court and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. We find no reason to make an exception for the defense of natural accumulation under Ohio law and thus bar Rannals’s negligence claim.(6) In sum, we believe that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on Rannals’s negligence claim under the Jones Act. Brinkman v. Ross, 623 N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ohio 1993). We do not believe that the Ohio common-law defense of natural accumulation can bar a seaman’s Jones Act claim. Co., 243 F.2d at 808-10. In so doing, this court in Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Burbank & Co., 451 F.2d 670, https://1xslots-online.com/providers/ 680 (2d Cir.

Co., 176 F.3d 891, 895 (6th Cir. Partnership, 111 F.3d 658, 662 (9th Cir. 1977), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 608 F.2d 1260 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added); see also De Centeno v. Gulf Fleet Crews, Inc., 798 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. See, e.g., Fitzgerald, 451 F.2d at 680. In our opinion, much like the employers in the medical providers cases, there is evidence that Diamond Jo entered into a contractual relationship with the training center when it chose the training center to teach its employees firefighting skills, made the arrangements for its employees to attend the training program,(4) and paid the training center for such services,(5) and the training center accepted such work by accepting Diamond Jo’s employees into its seminar and allowing them to attend its courses. Payne, 309 F.2d at 549. That it was the training center, and not Diamond Jo directly, that was negligent in failing to cure dangerous icy conditions at the program does not remove liability from Diamond Jo; Diamond Jo is still responsible for the negligence of its agent, in this case, the training center. J.A. at 141. We believe that all of this evidence is sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the training center had constructive notice of the dangerous icy conditions and should have cured or eliminated such conditions to reduce the possibility of harm to program attendees on site.

III. CONCLUSION In conclusion, we hold that Rannals created a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether she was acting within the course of her employment at the time of her injury on January 15, 1998; whether Diamond Jo or its agents, specifically the training center, breached a duty to provide a safe workplace for Diamond Jo’s employees by failing to cure icy road conditions on the training center’s driveway; whether Diamond Jo and the training center had entered into a contractual relationship as a result of Diamond Jo’s payment of its employees’ tuition costs and such employees’ participation in the training program; and whether the training center’s negligence, if found, may be imputed to Diamond Jo as a result of their contractual relationship. Second, we believe that Rannals has created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the training center had constructive notice of the dangerous icy conditions in its driveways and should have cured or eliminated such conditions to reduce the possibility of harm to program attendees on site.